5 papers
Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the tot…
Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having a…
Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment
Itai Arieli, Colin Stewart
We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifia…
Robust Price Discrimination
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon +1
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buy…
Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when condit…