269 citations · 337 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Contracting with a Learning Agent
Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider +4
Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions…
The Power of Menus in Contract Design
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua Wang +1
We study the power of menus of contracts in principal-agent problems with adverse selection (agents can be one of several types) and moral hazard (we cannot observe agent actions d…
Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders
Guru Guruganesh, Aranyak Mehta, Di Wang +1
We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to bidders whose values are drawn f…
Maximizing revenue in the presence of intermediaries
Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Guru Guruganesh +1
We study the mechanism design problem of selling items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is re…
Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua Wang
In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal must design a contract to incentivize an agent to perform an action on behalf of the principal. We study the classical princip…
Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctions
Zhe Feng, Guru Guruganesh, Christopher Liaw +2
The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produ…