activity
20142026
most citedWeighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation

58 citations · 163 across the 32 of their papers we have counts for

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21 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

Fair Allocation with Dichotomous Preferences over Item Complements

Soumyajit Pyne, Vignesh Viswanathan, Wenhao Yang +1

We study the problem of fair allocation when agents have dichotomous submodular preferences over groups of, rather than individual, items. These preferences naturally extend existi…

cs.GT2025

Stable Matching under Matroid Rank Valuations

Alon Eden, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We study a two-sided matching model where one side of the market (hospitals) has combinatorial preferences over the other side (doctors). Specifically, we consider the setting wher…

cs.GT2025

Deploying Fair and Efficient Course Allocation Mechanisms

George Bissias, Cyrus Cousins, Paula Navarrete Diaz +1

Universities regularly face the challenging task of assigning classes to thousands of students while considering their preferences, along with course schedules and capacities. Ensu…

cs.GT2024

Fair and Welfare-Efficient Constrained Multi-matchings under Uncertainty

Elita Lobo, Justin Payan, Cyrus Cousins +1

We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are n…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

On the Hardness of Fair Allocation under Ternary Valuations

Zack Fitzsimmons, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We study the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items when agents have ternary additive valuations -- each agent values each item at some fixed integer values , , or $…

cs.GT2023

The Good, the Bad and the Submodular: Fairly Allocating Mixed Manna Under Order-Neutral Submodular Preferences

Cyrus Cousins, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (positively valued items) and chores (negatively valued items) among agents with decreasing marginal utilities over item…

cs.GT2023

Weighted Notions of Fairness with Binary Supermodular Chores

Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We study the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with binary supermodular cost functions. In other words, each chore has a marginal cost of or and chores…

cs.GT2023★ 6 cited

For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods

Jonathan Scarlett, Nicholas Teh, Yair Zick

Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a well-explored problem. Traditionally, research focused on individual fairness - are individual agents satisfied with their allotted share?…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Dividing Good and Better Items Among Agents with Bivalued Submodular Valuations

Cyrus Cousins, Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with {\em bivalued submodular valuations} -- each good provides a marginal gain of either or $…

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

Into the Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to Papers with Uncertain Affinities

Cyrus Cousins, Justin Payan, Yair Zick

A successful peer review process requires that qualified and interested reviewers are assigned to each paper. Most automated reviewer assignment approaches estimate a real-valued a…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank Valuations

Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with matroid rank valuations -- every good provides a marginal value of or when added to a…

cs.GT2021★ 3 cited

I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment

Justin Payan, Yair Zick

We present fast, fair, flexible, and welfare efficient algorithms for assigning reviewers to submitted conference papers. Our approaches extend picking sequence mechanisms, standar…

cs.GT2020

The Price is (Probably) Right: Learning Market Equilibria from Samples

Vignesh Viswanathan, Omer Lev, Neel Patel +1

Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC l…

cs.GT2020★ 1 cited

Cumulative Games: Who is the current player?

Urban Larsson, Reshef Meir, Yair Zick

Combinatorial Game Theory(CGT)is a branch of Game Theory that has developed largely independently of Economic Game Theory (EGT), and is concerned with deep mathematical properties…

cs.GT2020

Keeping Your Friends Close: Land Allocation with Friends

Edith Elkind, Neel Patel, Alan Tsang +1

We examine the problem of assigning plots of land to prospective buyers who prefer living next to their friends. They care not only about the plot they receive, but also about thei…

cs.GT2019

Group-Fairness in Influence Maximization

Alan Tsang, Bryan Wilder, Eric Rice +2

Influence maximization is a widely used model for information dissemination in social networks. Recent work has employed such interventions across a wide range of social problems,…

cs.GT2018★ 4 cited

Forming Probably Stable Communities with Limited Interactions

Ayumi Igarashi, Jakub Sliwinski, Yair Zick

A community needs to be partitioned into disjoint groups; each community member has an underlying preference over the groups that they would want to be a member of. We are interest…

cs.GT2015

Learning Cooperative Games

Maria-Florina Balcan, Ariel D. Procaccia, Yair Zick

This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given random samples of coalitions and their values, taken…

cs.GT2015★ 17 cited

Influence in Classification via Cooperative Game Theory

Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia +1

A dataset has been classified by some unknown classifier into two types of points. What were the most important factors in determining the classification outcome? In this work, we…

cs.GT2014★ 3 cited

Power Distribution in Randomized Weighted Voting: the Effects of the Quota

Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, Yair Zick +1

We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and politica…

cs.GT2014

Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions: Charting the Tractability Frontier

Yair Zick, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind +1

In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be div…