8 citations · 29 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers · 1 filter
Human vs. Generative AI in Content Creation Competition: Symbiosis or Conflict?
Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov +2
The advent of generative AI (GenAI) technology produces transformative impact on the content creation landscape, offering alternative approaches to produce diverse, high-quality co…
How Bad is Top- Recommendation under Competing Content Creators?
Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov +2
Content creators compete for exposure on recommendation platforms, and such strategic behavior leads to a dynamic shift over the content distribution. However, how the creators' co…
Bias-Variance Games
Yiding Feng, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason Hartline +2
Firms engaged in electronic commerce increasingly rely on predictive analytics via machine-learning algorithms to drive a wide array of managerial decisions. The tuning of many sta…
Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov +1
This paper gives a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online marketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We a…
Inference from Auction Prices
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov +1
Econometric inference allows an analyst to back out the values of agents in a mechanism from the rules of the mechanism and bids of the agents. This paper gives an algorithm to sol…
Mechanism Redesign
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov +1
This paper develops the theory of mechanism redesign by which an auctioneer can reoptimize an auction based on bid data collected from previous iterations of the auction on bidders…
Learning and Trust in Auction Markets
Pooya Jalaly, Denis Nekipelov, Eva Tardos
In this paper, we study behavior of bidders in an experimental launch of a new advertising auction platform by Zillow, as Zillow switched from negotiated contracts to using auction…
A/B Testing of Auctions
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov
For many application areas A/B testing, which partitions users of a system into an A (control) and B (treatment) group to experiment between several application designs, enables In…
Econometrics for Learning Agents
Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibr…
Efficiency Guarantees from Data
Darrell Hoy, Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis
Analysis of efficiency of outcomes in game theoretic settings has been a main item of study at the intersection of economics and computer science. The notion of the price of anarch…
Mechanism Design for Data Science
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, Denis Nekipelov
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve pric…