activity
20152023
most citedIncentive Design for Ridesharing with Uncertainty

11 citations · 38 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

20 papers

cs.GT2023

Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials

Yuxin Zhao, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

Selecting influentials in networks against strategic manipulations has attracted many researchers' attention and it also has many practical applications. Here, we aim to select one…

cs.GT20223 cited

Sybil-Proof Diffusion Auction in Social Networks

Hongyin Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Ying Wang +2

A diffusion auction is a market to sell commodities over a social network, where the challenge is to incentivize existing buyers to invite their neighbors in the network to join th…

cs.GT2022

Multi-Unit Diffusion Auctions with Intermediaries

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao

This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each ot…

cs.GT2022

Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty

Xiuzhen Zhang, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

We study a single task allocation problem where each worker connects to some other workers to form a network and the task requester only connects to some of the workers. The goal i…

cs.GT2021

Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection

Xiuzhen Zhang, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

Selecting the most influential agent in a network has huge practical value in applications. However, in many scenarios, the graph structure can only be known from agents' reports o…

cs.GT20216 cited

Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions

Dengji Zhao

Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner c…