activity
20132026
most citedIncentive Design for Ridesharing with Uncertainty

11 citations · 63 across the 30 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

32 papers

cs.AI2026

Fishing Out Free Riders: Shapley-Based Reward Attribution for Parallel Reasoning via Reinforcement Learning

Wentao Zhang, Haoyu Zhang, Xinke Jiang +7

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at multi-step reasoning, yet current parallel reasoning approaches often fail to distinguish the contributions of individual reasoning paths. Man…

cs.GT2023

Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials

Yuxin Zhao, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

Selecting influentials in networks against strategic manipulations has attracted many researchers' attention and it also has many practical applications. Here, we aim to select one…

cs.GT2023

Cost Sharing under Private Valuation and Connection Control

Tianyi Zhang, Junyu Zhang, Sizhe Gu +1

We consider a cost sharing problem on a weighted undirected graph, where all the nodes want to connect to a special node called source, and they need to share the total cost (weigh…

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

Distributed Mechanism Design in Social Networks

Haoxin Liu, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

Designing auctions to incentivize buyers to invite new buyers via their social connections is a new trend in mechanism design. The challenge is that buyers are competitors and we n…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

A Redistribution Framework for Diffusion Auctions

Sizhe Gu, Yao Zhang, Yida Zhao +1

Redistribution mechanism design aims to redistribute the revenue collected by a truthful auction back to its participants without affecting the truthfulness. We study redistributio…

cs.GT2023

Connected Trading Cycles

Xinwei Song, Tianyi Yang, Dengji Zhao

Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Optimal Diffusion Auctions

Yao Zhang, Shanshan Zheng, Dengji Zhao

Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design for which the main goal is to incentivize existing buyers to invite new buyers, who are their neighbors on a social netw…

cs.GT2022★ 3 cited

Sybil-Proof Diffusion Auction in Social Networks

Hongyin Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Ying Wang +2

A diffusion auction is a market to sell commodities over a social network, where the challenge is to incentivize existing buyers to invite their neighbors in the network to join th…

cs.GT2022

Multi-Unit Diffusion Auctions with Intermediaries

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao

This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each ot…

cs.GT2022

Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty

Xiuzhen Zhang, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

We study a single task allocation problem where each worker connects to some other workers to form a network and the task requester only connects to some of the workers. The goal i…

cs.GT2022★ 3 cited

Diffusion Multi-unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers

Haolin Liu, Xinyuan Lian, Dengji Zhao

We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Cost Sharing for Connectivity with Budget

Tianyi Zhang, Dengji Zhao, Junyu Zhang +1

We consider a cost sharing problem to connect all nodes in a weighted undirected graph, where the weight of each edge represents the cost to use the edge for the connectivity and t…

cs.GT2022★ 2 cited

Truthful and Stable One-sided Matching on Networks

Tianyi Yang, Yuxiang Zhai, Dengji Zhao +2

Mechanism design on social networks is a hot research direction recently, and we have seen many interesting results in auctions and matching. Compared to the traditional settings,…

cs.GT2021

Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection

Xiuzhen Zhang, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

Selecting the most influential agent in a network has huge practical value in applications. However, in many scenarios, the graph structure can only be known from agents' reports o…

cs.GT2021★ 6 cited

Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions

Dengji Zhao

Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner c…

cs.GT2020★ 3 cited

Incentives to Invite Others to Form Larger Coalitions

Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to…

cs.GT2020★ 6 cited

Barter Exchange via Friends' Friends

Yue Zheng, Tianyi Yang, Wen Zhang +1

Barter exchange studies the setting where each agent owns a good, and they can exchange with each other if that gives them more preferred goods. This exchange will give better outc…

cs.GT2020★ 3 cited

Sybil-proof Answer Querying Mechanism

Yao Zhang, Xiuzhen Zhang, Dengji Zhao

We study a question answering problem on a social network, where a requester is seeking an answer from the agents on the network. The goal is to design reward mechanisms to incenti…

cs.GT2020★ 4 cited

Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao

Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via socia…

cs.GT2019★ 4 cited

Maximal Information Propagation with Budgets

Haomin Shi, Yao Zhang, Zilin Si +2

In this paper, we present an information propagation game on a network where the information is originated from a sponsor who is willing to pay a fixed total budget to the players…

cs.GT2019

Coalitional Games with Stochastic Characteristic Functions and Private Types

Dengji Zhao, Yiqing Huang, Liat Cohen +1

The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (determin…

cs.AI2019

Redistribution Mechanism on Networks

Wen Zhang, Dengji Zhao, Hanyu Chen

Redistribution mechanisms have been proposed for more efficient resource allocation but not for profit. We consider redistribution mechanism design in a setting where participants…

cs.GT2019★ 8 cited

Incentivize Diffusion with Fair Rewards

Wen Zhang, Dengji Zhao, Yao Zhang

This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design problem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her revenue.…

cs.GT2019

Diffusion and Auction on Graphs

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao +1

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's re…