9 citations · 27 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique +1
Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and t…
The Network Improvement Problem for Equilibrium Routing
Umang Bhaskar, Katrina Ligett, Leonard J. Schulman
In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at…
The Empirical Implications of Rank in Bimatrix Games
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique +1
We study the structural complexity of bimatrix games, formalized via rank, from an empirical perspective. We consider a setting where we have data on player behavior in diverse str…