44 citations · 107 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
A Game-Theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy
Jeffrey Pawlick, Edward Colbert, Quanyan Zhu
Cyberattacks on both databases and critical infrastructure have threatened public and private sectors. Ubiquitous tracking and wearable computing have infringed upon privacy. Advoc…
Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Network Security using Signaling Games with Evidence
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and inform…
Optimal Timing in Dynamic and Robust Attacker Engagement During Advanced Persistent Threats
Jeffrey Pawlick, Thi Thu Hang Nguyen, Edward Colbert +1
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to networked systems. Against APTs, ac…
Proactive Defense Against Physical Denial of Service Attacks using Poisson Signaling Games
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
While the Internet of things (IoT) promises to improve areas such as energy efficiency, health care, and transportation, it is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. In particular, dis…
A Mean-Field Stackelberg Game Approach for Obfuscation Adoption in Empirical Risk Minimization
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
Data ecosystems are becoming larger and more complex due to online tracking, wearable computing, and the Internet of Things. But privacy concerns are threatening to erode the poten…
Proactive Population-Risk Based Defense Against Denial of Cyber-Physical Service Attacks
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
While the Internet of things (IoT) promises to improve areas such as energy efficiency, health care, and transportation, it is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. In particular, DDo…
Phishing for Phools in the Internet of Things: Modeling One-to-Many Deception using Poisson Signaling Games
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
Strategic interactions ranging from politics and pharmaceuticals to e-commerce and social networks support equilibria in which agents with private information manipulate others whi…