194 citations · 998 across the 36 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers · 1 filter
Optimal Spend Rate Estimation and Pacing for Ad Campaigns with Budgets
Bhuvesh Kumar, Jamie Morgenstern, Okke Schrijvers
Online ad platforms offer budget management tools for advertisers that aim to maximize the number of conversions given a budget constraint. As the volume of impressions, conversion…
Competition Alleviates Present Bias in Task Completion
Aditya Saraf, Anna R. Karlin, Jamie Morgenstern
We build upon recent work [Kleinberg and Oren, 2014, Kleinberg et al., 2016, 2017] that considers present biased agents, who place more weight on costs they must incur now than cos…
Network Formation under Random Attack and Probabilistic Spread
Yu Chen, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns +2
We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Sp…
Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents
Sampath Kannan, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern +4
We consider settings in which we wish to incentivize myopic agents (such as Airbnb landlords, who may emphasize short-term profits and property safety) to treat arriving clients fa…
Simple Mechanisms For Agents With Complements
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern +1
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. [DMSW15] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of $O(\log m)…
Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization
Sanjeev Goyal, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns +2
Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game t…
Do Prices Coordinate Markets?
Justin Hsu, Jamie Morgenstern, Ryan Rogers +2
Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most pr…
The Pseudo-Dimension of Near-Optimal Auctions
Jamie Morgenstern, Tim Roughgarden
This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce -level auctions to…
Learning What's going on: reconstructing preferences and priorities from opaque transactions
Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour, Jamie Morgenstern
We consider a setting where buyers, with combinatorial preferences over items, and a seller, running a priority-based allocation mechanism, repeatedly interact. Our goal, f…
Learning Valuation Distributions from Partial Observation
Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour, Jamie Morgenstern
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders' valuation distributions are known to the auctioneer, such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction. However, this th…
Private Pareto Optimal Exchange
Sampath Kannan, Jamie Morgenstern, Ryan Rogers +1
We consider the problem of implementing an individually rational, asymptotically Pareto optimal allocation in a barter-exchange economy where agents are endowed with goods and have…
Approximately Stable, School Optimal, and Student-Truthful Many-to-One Matchings (via Differential Privacy)
Sampath Kannan, Jamie Morgenstern, Aaron Roth +1
We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their…
Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games
Avrim Blum, Jamie Morgenstern, Ankit Sharma +1
In settings with incomplete information, players can find it difficult to coordinate to find states with good social welfare. For example, in financial settings, if a collection of…
Draft Auctions
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jamie Morgenstern, Vasilis Syrgkanis
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer…