5 citations · 13 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Onions in the ATmosphere: Decentralizing Trust in Identity
Paul Syverson, Nick Gerakines
Multiple approaches have been implemented for identities that associate meaningful identifiers, such as domain names, with self-authenticating identifiers, such as onion addresses.…
A Logic of Sattestation
Aaron D. Jaggard, Paul Syverson, Catherine Meadows
We introduce a logic for reasoning about contextual trust for web addresses, provide a Kripke semantics for it, and prove its soundness under reasonable assumptions about principal…
Privacy-Protecting COVID-19 Exposure Notification Based on Cluster Events
Paul Syverson
We provide a rough sketch of a simple system design for exposure notification of COVID-19 infections based on copresence at cluster events -- locations and times where a threshold…
Attacks on Onion Discovery and Remedies via Self-Authenticating Traditional Addresses
Paul Syverson, Matthew Finkel, Saba Eskandarian +1
Onion addresses encode their own public key. They are thus self-authenticating, one of the security and privacy advantages of onion services, which are typically accessed via Tor B…
Onions in the Crosshairs: When The Man really is out to get you
Aaron D. Jaggard, Paul Syverson
We introduce and investigate *targeting adversaries* who selectively attack users of Tor or other secure-communication networks. We argue that attacks by such adversaries are more…
Avoiding The Man on the Wire: Improving Tor's Security with Trust-Aware Path Selection
Aaron Johnson, Rob Jansen, Aaron D. Jaggard +2
Tor users are vulnerable to deanonymization by an adversary that can observe some Tor relays or some parts of the network. We demonstrate that previous network-aware path-selection…
Genuine onion: Simple, Fast, Flexible, and Cheap Website Authentication
Paul Syverson, Griffin Boyce
Tor is a communications infrastructure widely used for unfettered and anonymous access to Internet websites. Tor is also used to access sites on the .onion virtual domain. The focu…
Representing Network Trust and Using It to Improve Anonymous Communication
Aaron D. Jaggard, Aaron Johnson, Paul Syverson +1
Motivated by the effectiveness of correlation attacks against Tor, the censorship arms race, and observations of malicious relays in Tor, we propose that Tor users capture their tr…
Probabilistic Analysis of Onion Routing in a Black-box Model
Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron Johnson, Paul Syverson
We perform a probabilistic analysis of onion routing. The analysis is presented in a black-box model of anonymous communication in the Universally Composable framework that abstrac…