16 papers
Algorithms for Candidate Control in Greedy Participatory Budgeting Rules
Å imon Schierreich, Krzysztof Sornat
We study the problem of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. Our focus is on two prominent sequential welfare-based rules---GreedyAV and GreedyCost---which are w…
Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Å imon Schierreich +1
We study network allocation games in which a set of agents must be allocated to (a subset of) the vertices of a graph topology. The agents are anonymous and strategic: Each of them…
An Entropy Potential for Type-Composition Games
Morteza Alimi, Merlin de la Haye, Pascal Lenzner +3
Potential functions are a key tool in theoretical computer science with applications ranging from the runtime analysis of algorithms and data structures, through the analysis of th…
What Makes Majority Illusion Easy to Detect?
Šimon Schierreich, Ildikó Schlotter
Majority illusion is an undesirable phenomenon in social networks in which agents incorrectly perceive a minority opinion as dominant. This can severely distort collective behavior…
Balancing the Spread of Two Opinions in Sparse Social Networks
DuÅ¡an Knop, Å imon Schierreich, OndÅej Suchý
Inspired by the famous Target Set Selection problem, we propose a new discrete model to simultaneously spread two opinions within a social network and perform an initial study of i…
Navigating the Complexity Landscape of Nominee Selection in Schulze Voting
KatarÃna Cechlárová, Jörg Rothe, Å imon Schierreich +1
We study the Possible President problem and the Necessary President problem for Schulze voting, a rule that, due to its many desirable axiomatic properties, is popular in practice.…