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20142026
most citedPerfect Prediction in Normal Form: Superrational Thinking Extended to Non-Symmetric Games

18 citations · 46 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for

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cs.GT2020

Games in Minkowski Spacetime

Ghislain Fourny

This paper contributes a new class of games called spacetime games with perfect information. In spacetime games, the agents make decisions at various positions in Minkowski spaceti…

cs.GT2019★ 4 cited

Perfect Prediction in Minkowski Spacetime: Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information

Ghislain Fourny

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge tha…

cs.GT2018★ 2 cited

Kripke Semantics of the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium

Ghislain Fourny

The Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium is algorithmically defined, for any game in normal form with perfect information and no ties, as the iterated deletion of non-individually-rat…

cs.GT2017★ 18 cited

Perfect Prediction in Normal Form: Superrational Thinking Extended to Non-Symmetric Games

Ghislain Fourny

This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are ratio…

cs.GT2017★ 1 cited

Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality Subsumes Superrationality On Symmetric Games

Ghislain Fourny

This paper shows that, for symmetric games in normal form, strategy profiles that satisfy Hofstadter's Superrationality criterion also satisfy both of Halpern's and Pass's criteria…

cs.GT2017

On the Importance of Correlations in Rational Choice: A Case for Non-Nashian Game Theory

Ghislain Fourny

The Nash equilibrium paradigm, and Rational Choice Theory in general, rely on agents acting independently from each other. This note shows how this assumption is crucial in the def…

cs.GT2014★ 4 cited

Perfect Prediction Equilibrium

Ghislain Fourny, Stéphane Reiche, Jean-Pierre Dupuy

In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibr…