3 papers
econ.TH2025
Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations
Ehud Lehrer, Dimitry Shaiderman
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, whil…
math.OC2025
On the Monotonicity and Rate of Convergence of the Markovian Persuasion Value
Dimitry Shaiderman
We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion model called Markovian persuasion. In such a model, the belief of the receiver regarding the current state of a Markov chain $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}…
cs.GT2024
Persuading while Learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman +1
We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers informatio…