2 citations · 2 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Exploring the Environmental Benefits of In-Process Isolation for Software Resilience
Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman, Christoph Baumann +1
Memory-related errors remain an important cause of software vulnerabilities. While mitigation techniques such as using memory-safe languages are promising solutions, these do not a…
Friend or Foe Inside? Exploring In-Process Isolation to Maintain Memory Safety for Unsafe Rust
Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman, Christoph Baumann +1
Rust is a popular memory-safe systems programming language. In order to interact with hardware or call into non-Rust libraries, Rust provides \emph{unsafe} language features that s…
Protecting the stack with PACed canaries
Hans Liljestrand, Zaheer Gauhar, Thomas Nyman +2
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcin…
PACStack: an Authenticated Call Stack
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Lachlan J. Gunn +2
A popular run-time attack technique is to compromise the control-flow integrity of a program by modifying function return addresses on the stack. So far, shadow stacks have proven…
Exploitation Techniques and Defenses for Data-Oriented Attacks
Long Cheng, Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman +4
Data-oriented attacks manipulate non-control data to alter a program's benign behavior without violating its control-flow integrity. It has been shown that such attacks can cause s…
PAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer Authentication
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Kui Wang +3
Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of techniques…