50 citations · 244 across the 32 of their papers we have counts for
43 papers
Finding Representative and Approximately Efficient Committees
Dominik Peters, Rohit Vaish, Jatin Yadav
In approval-based committee voting, proportional approval voting (PAV) is a well-studied rule that combines proportional representation with Pareto efficiency. However, computing a…
Candidate Resignation Monotonicity in Approval-Based Committee Elections
Yeeseok Oh, Dominik Peters
Approval-based committee (ABC) elections select a fixed-size committee of candidates based on voters' approval preferences. We study a setting where elected members may resign and…
Proportional Fairness for Harmful Decisions
Benjamin Cookson, Soroush Ebadian, Dominik Peters +1
We study allocation of (divisible) public bads, where agents incur costs for alternatives and the goal is to pick a lottery over the alternatives. We show that the traditional defi…
Kemeny Rank Aggregation is NP-Hard for Three Voters
Dominik Peters
Rank aggregation is the task of combining input rankings (linear orders) of alternatives into a single output ranking. The Kemeny rank aggregation rule selects the output ranki…
Reallocating Wasted Votes in Proportional Parliamentary Elections with Thresholds
Théo Delemazure, Rupert Freeman, Jérôme Lang +2
In many proportional parliamentary elections, electoral thresholds (typically 3-5%) are used to promote stability and governability by preventing the election of parties with very…
Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps
Christian Kroer, Dominik Peters
Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocat…
The Core of Approval-Based Committee Elections with Few Seats
Dominik Peters
In an approval-based committee election, the goal is to select a committee consisting of out of candidates, based on voters who each approve an arbitrary number of the…
Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates
Felix Brandt, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters
A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have fa…
Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences
Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Dominik Peters +2
We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compat…
Comparing Ways of Obtaining Candidate Orderings from Approval Ballots
Théo Delemazure, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters +1
To understand and summarize approval preferences and other binary evaluation data, it is useful to order the items on an axis which explains the data. In a political election using…
Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences
Théo Delemazure, Dominik Peters
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in elections for many political offices around the world. It allows voters to specify their preferences among candidates as a ranking. We identi…
The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings
Patrick Lederer, Dominik Peters, Tomasz Wąs
For the problem of aggregating several rankings into one ranking, Kemeny (1959) proposed two methods: the median rule which selects the ranking with the smallest total swap distanc…
Evaluation of Project Performance in Participatory Budgeting
Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko +5
We study ways of evaluating the performance of losing projects in participatory budgeting (PB) elections by seeking actions that would have led to their victory. We focus on loweri…
Designing Digital Voting Systems for Citizens: Achieving Fairness and Legitimacy in Participatory Budgeting
Joshua C. Yang, Carina I. Hausladen, Dominik Peters +3
Participatory Budgeting (PB) has evolved into a key democratic instrument for resource allocation in cities. Enabled by digital platforms, cities now have the opportunity to let ci…
Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Making
Nikhil Chandak, Shashwat Goel, Dominik Peters
We study the problem of fair sequential decision making given voter preferences. In each round, a decision rule must choose a decision from a set of alternatives where each voter r…
Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysis
Piotr Faliszewski, Jarosław Flis, Dominik Peters +5
We provide a library of participatory budgeting data (Pabulib) and open source tools (Pabutools and Pabustats) for analysing this data. We analyse how the results of participatory…
Rank Aggregation Using Scoring Rules
Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Dominik Peters
To aggregate rankings into a social ranking, one can use scoring systems such as Plurality, Veto, and Borda. We distinguish three types of methods: ranking by score, ranking by rep…
Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting
Soroush Ebadian, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters +1
A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal ut…
Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey
Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structur…
In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins
Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia
Apportionment is the problem of distributing indivisible seats across states in proportion to the states' populations. In the context of the US House of Representatives, this p…
How to Fairly Allocate Easy and Difficult Chores
Soroush Ebadian, Dominik Peters, Nisarg Shah
A major open question in fair allocation of indivisible items is whether there always exists an allocation of chores that is Pareto optimal (PO) and envy-free up to one item (EF1).…
Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections
Dominik Peters
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or…
District-Fair Participatory Budgeting
D Ellis Hershkowitz, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters +1
Participatory budgeting is a method used by city governments to select public projects to fund based on residents' votes. Many cities use participatory budgeting at a district leve…
Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities
Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have…