2 citations · 2 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games with Planned Actions and Scouting
Wolfgang Kuhle
We study coordination games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information about…
Endogenous Fertility Waves and the Dynamics of Utility in an Overlapping Generations Model
Wolfgang Kuhle
This paper investigates the conditions under which the Easterlin hypothesis holds within a neoclassical overlapping generations model with endogenous capital accumulation, wages, i…
Janus-Faced Technological Progress and the Arms Race in the Education of Humans and Chatbots
Wolfgang Kuhle
We study the conditions under which technological advances, in combination with a lognormal wage distribution, incentivize agents into an inefficient educational arms race. Our mod…
Information Aggregation in Markets with Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots
Wolfgang Kuhle
The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset pri…
Games with Planned Actions and Scouting
Wolfgang Kuhle
We study games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Moreover, before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information that they…
On Market Design and Latency Arbitrage
Wolfgang Kuhle
We argue that contemporary stock market designs are, due to traders' inability to fully express their preferences over the execution times of their orders, prone to latency arbitra…
The Inflation Game
Wolfgang Kuhle
We study a game where households convert paper assets, such as money, into consumption goods, to preempt inflation. The game features a unique equilibrium with high (low) inflation…
Observing Actions in Global Games
Dominik Grafenhofer, Wolfgang Kuhle
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is o…
Observing Actions in Bayesian Games
Dominik Grafenhofer, Wolfgang Kuhle
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over act…
Thought Viruses and Asset Prices
Wolfgang Kuhle
We use insights from epidemiology, namely the SIR model, to study how agents infect each other with "investment ideas." Once an investment idea "goes viral," equilibrium prices exh…
An Equilibrium Model with Computationally Constrained Agents
Wolfgang Kuhle
We study a large economy in which firms cannot compute exact solutions to the non-linear equations that characterize the equilibrium price at which they can sell future output. Ins…
Darwinian Adverse Selection
Wolfgang Kuhle
We develop a model to study the role of rationality in economics and biology. The model's agents differ continuously in their ability to make rational choices. The agents' objectiv…
A Global Game with Heterogenous Priors
Wolfgang Kuhle
This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expecta…