3 papers
econ.TH2025
Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information
Dirk Bergemann, Marek Bojko, Paul Dütting +3
We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensiona…
cs.GT2025
Procurement Auctions with Best and Final Offers
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Randolph Preston McAfee, Renato Paes Leme
We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller to effectively ``freez…
cs.GT2024
Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems
Renato Paes Leme, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider +2
It has become the default in markets such as ad auctions for participants to bid in an auction through automated bidding agents (autobidders) which adjust bids over time to satisfy…