3 papers
cs.GT2025
Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users
Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, Chenghan Zhou
We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contes…
cs.GT2025
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive c…
cs.GT2024
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considere…