3 papers
econ.TH2026
Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard
Maryam Saeedi, Ali Shourideh
We study optimal rating design under moral hazard and strategic manipulation. An intermediary observes a noisy indicator of effort and commits to a rating policy that shapes market…
econ.TH2025
Good Data and Bad Data: The Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination
Maryam Farboodi, Nima Haghpanah, Ali Shourideh
We study how a monopolist's use of consumer data for price discrimination affects welfare. To answer this question, we develop a model of market segmentation subject to residual un…
econ.TH2025
Divide and Confer: Aggregating Information without Verification
James Best, Daniel Quigley, Maryam Saeedi +1
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an…