4 papers
Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences
Edith Elkind, Matthias Greger, Patrick Lederer +2
We study a portioning setting in which a public resource such as time or money is to be divided among a given set of candidates, and each agent proposes a division of the resource.…
Proportional Justified Representation
Luis Sánchez-Fernández, Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner +4
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters' preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters…
Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg
We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a play…
Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey
Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structur…