algorithmic collusion 1correlated equilibrium 1information economics 1learning in games 1regulation 1
From the 1 of 2 linked papers with an AI index.
2 papers
cs.GT2026
The Computable but Not Learnable Information-Value-Free Equilibria and Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion
Jason D. Hartline, Chang Wang, Chenhao Zhang
The paper shows that while certain information‑value‑free correlated equilibria can be computed efficiently, they cannot be learned online by many standard learning algorithms, hig…
econ.TH2026
Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
Jason Hartline
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total au…