70 citations · 1.1k across the 129 of their papers we have counts for
32 papers · 1 filter
The Art and Beauty of Voting Power
Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, Stefan Napel
We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index to social choice rules. Three players who have multiple v…
The Public Good index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
Sascha Kurz
The Public Good index is a power index for simple games introduced by Holler and later axiomatized by Holler and Packel, so that some authors also speak of the Holler--Packel index…
A note on the growth of the dimension in complete simple games
Sascha Kurz
The remoteness from a simple game to a weighted game can be measured by the concept of the dimension or the more general Boolean dimension. It is known that both notions can be exp…
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Sascha Kurz
Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rule…
Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
Sascha Kurz, Issofa Moyouwou, Hilaire Touyem
The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalize…
Influence in Weighted Committees
Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, Stefan Napel
A committee's decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted voting method, and so does the distribution of power among the committee members. We investigate ho…