4 papers
Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware Payment
Haoran Sun, Xuanzhi Xia, Xu Chu +1
Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibi…
Mechanism Design for LLM Fine-tuning with Multiple Reward Models
Haoran Sun, Yurong Chen, Siwei Wang +3
Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) to aggregate multiple preferences has attracted considerable research attention. With aggregation algorithms advancing, a potential economi…
ALPINE: Unveiling the Planning Capability of Autoregressive Learning in Language Models
Siwei Wang, Yifei Shen, Shi Feng +3
Planning is a crucial element of both human intelligence and contemporary large language models (LLMs). In this paper, we initiate a theoretical investigation into the emergence of…
Automated Deterministic Auction Design with Objective Decomposition
Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yichong Xia +6
Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While t…