4 papers
Bayesian Persuasion under Bias Management
Kemal Ozbek
A principal delegates choice to an agent whose decision depends on both beliefs and tastes. The principal can steer the delegated decision using two costly instruments: (i) an info…
Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Persuasion
Youichiro Higashi, Kemal Ozbek, Norio Takeoka
In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., rec…
Optimal Auction Design under Costly Learning
Kemal Ozbek
We study optimal auction design in an independent private values environment where bidders can endogenously -- but at a cost -- improve information about their own valuations. The…
Flexible Learning via Noise Reduction
Peter Achim, Kemal Ozbek
We develop a novel framework for costly information acquisition in which a decision-maker learns about an unobserved state by choosing a signal distribution, with the cost of infor…