activity
20162022
most citedExtensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium Computation in Two-Player Games

10 citations · 19 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

cs.CL2023

Regularized Conventions: Equilibrium Computation as a Model of Pragmatic Reasoning

Athul Paul Jacob, Gabriele Farina, Jacob Andreas

We present a model of pragmatic language understanding, where utterances are produced and understood by searching for regularized equilibria of signaling games. In this model (whic…

cs.GT2023

The Consensus Game: Language Model Generation via Equilibrium Search

Athul Paul Jacob, Yikang Shen, Gabriele Farina +1

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discri…

cs.GT20231 cited

Regret Matching+: (In)Stability and Fast Convergence in Games

Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément, Christian Kroer +2

Regret Matching+ (RM+) and its variants are important algorithms for solving large-scale games. However, a theoretical understanding of their success in practice is still a mystery…

cs.GT20221 cited

Clairvoyant Regret Minimization: Equivalence with Nemirovski's Conceptual Prox Method and Extension to General Convex Games

Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Chung-Wei Lee +1

A recent paper by Piliouras et al. [2021, 2022] introduces an uncoupled learning algorithm for normal-form games -- called Clairvoyant MWU (CMWU). In this note we show that CMWU is…

cs.GT2021

Fast Payoff Matrix Sparsification Techniques for Structured Extensive-Form Games

Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm

The practical scalability of many optimization algorithms for large extensive-form games is often limited by the games' huge payoff matrices. To ameliorate the issue, Zhang and San…

cs.GT201610 cited

Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium Computation in Two-Player Games

Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti

We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t.…