2 citations · 2 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
math.OC2020
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
Françoise Forges, Jérôme Renault
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We s…
math.OC2019
The Large Space of Information Structures
Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Peski, Jérôme Renault
We revisit the question of modeling incomplete information among 2 Bayesian players, following an ex-ante approach based on values of zero-sum games. being the finite set of po…
math.PR2014★ 2 cited
Optimal Dynamic Information Provision
Jerome Renault, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille
We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An informed advisor decides how much information to provide to an uninform…