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econ.TH2026
Calibrated Mechanism Design
Laura Doval, Alex Smolin
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static fram…
econ.TH2025
Revealed Information
Laura Doval, Ran Eilat, Tianhao Liu +1
An analyst observes the frequency with which a decision maker (DM) takes actions, but not the frequency conditional on payoff-relevant states. We ask when the analyst can rationali…
econ.TH2024
Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets
Laura Doval, Pablo Schenone
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the s…