activity
20122024
most citedDeducing Security Goals From Shape Analysis Sentences

10 citations · 27 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

8 papers

cs.CR2024

Evidence Tampering and Chain of Custody in Layered Attestations

Ian D. Kretz, Clare C. Parran, John D. Ramsdell +1

In distributed systems, trust decisions are made on the basis of integrity evidence generated via remote attestation. Examples of the kinds of evidence that might be collected are…

cs.CR2018

Homomorphisms and Minimality for Enrich-by-Need Security Analysis

Daniel J. Dougherty, Joshua D. Guttman, John D. Ramsdell

Cryptographic protocols are used in different environments, but existing methods for protocol analysis focus only on the protocols, without being sensitive to assumptions about the…

cs.CR2018★ 1 cited

Enrich-by-need Protocol Analysis for Diffie-Hellman (Extended Version)

Moses D. Liskov, Joshua D. Guttman, John D. Ramsdell +2

Enrich-by-need protocol analysis is a style of symbolic protocol analysis that characterizes all executions of a protocol that extend a given scenario. In effect, it computes a str…

cs.CR2015★ 5 cited

Formal Support for Standardizing Protocols with State

Joshua D. Guttman, Moses D. Liskov, John D. Ramsdell +1

Many cryptographic protocols are designed to achieve their goals using only messages passed over an open network. Numerous tools, based on well-understood foundations, exist for th…

cs.CR2014★ 2 cited

A Hybrid Analysis for Security Protocols with State

John D. Ramsdell, Daniel J. Dougherty, Joshua D. Guttman +1

Cryptographic protocols rely on message-passing to coordinate activity among principals. Each principal maintains local state in individual local sessions only as needed to complet…

cs.CR2014★ 3 cited

Proving Security Goals With Shape Analysis Sentences

John D. Ramsdell

The paper that introduced shape analysis sentences presented a method for extracting a sentence in first-order logic that completely characterizes a run of CPSA. Logical deduction…