works on

From the 1 of 7 linked papers with an AI index.

activity
20242026
collaborators

7 papers

cs.CY2026

Is Solving Better Than Evaluating GenAI Solutions?

Ethan Dickey, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas

The paper reports a randomized crossover study in a junior-level algorithms course comparing student learning outcomes when they evaluate GenAI-generated solutions versus when they…

cs.GT2026

On the Existence of Fair Allocations for Goods and Chores under Dissimilar Preferences

Egor Gagushin, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas

We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a multiset of types of indivisible items among groups of agents, where all agents within a group have id…

cs.GT2025

Facility Location for Congesting Commuters and Generalizing the Cost-Distance Problem

Thanasis Lianeas, Marios Mertzanidis, Aikaterini Nikolidaki

In Facility Location problems there are agents that should be connected to facilities and locations where facilities may be opened so that agents can connect to them. We depart fro…

cs.GT2025

Hallucinating Flows for Optimal Mechanisms

Marios Mertzanidis, Athina Terzoglou

Myerson's seminal characterization of the revenue-optimal auction for a single item \cite{myerson1981optimal} remains a cornerstone of mechanism design. However, generalizing this…

cs.GT2024

Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding

Gagan Aggarwal, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas +1

We consider the problem of a designer who wants to allocate resources to representatives, that then distribute the resources they receive among the individuals they represent. Moti…

cs.GT2024

Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation

Kshipra Bhawalkar, Marios Mertzanidis, Divyarthi Mohan +1

We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei~\cite{alaei201…