6 citations · 32 across the 37 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Sampling and Optimal Preference Elicitation in Simple Mechanisms
Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximation…
Dimensionality, Coordination, and Robustness in Voting
Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos
We study the performance of voting mechanisms from a utilitarian standpoint, under the recently introduced framework of metric-distortion, offering new insights along three main li…
Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information
Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos
In this work we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechan…
Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances
Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos
We consider -Facility Location games, where strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to facilities. Each agent seeks to m…
Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions
Giannis Fikioris, Dimitris Fotakis
Motivated by recent research on combinatorial markets with endowed valuations by (Babaioff et al., EC 2018) and (Ezra et al., EC 2020), we introduce a notion of perturbation stabil…
Local Aggregation in Preference Games
Angelo Fanelli, Dimitris Fotakis
In this work we introduce a new model of decision-making by agents in a social network. Agents have innate preferences over the strategies but, because of the social interactions,…