2 citations · 7 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Welfare Maximization in Procurement Auctions
Shuang Cui, He Huang, Yu-e Sun +1
Budget-feasible procurement auctions play a pivotal role in various AI-driven marketplaces, such as data acquisition and crowdsourcing, where a buyer with a limited budget seeks to…
PPS: Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Social-Efficient Spectrum Auction Mechanisms
He Huang, Xiang-Yang Li, Yu-e Sun +2
Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social effic…
Near-Optimal Truthful Auction Mechanisms in Secondary Spectrum Markets
Yu-e Sun, He Huang, Xiang-Yang Li +4
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the r…
True-MCSA: A Framework for Truthful Double Multi-Channel Spectrum Auctions
Zhili Chen, He Huang, Liusheng Huang
We design a framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions where each seller (or buyer) can sell (or buy) multiple spectrum channels based on their individual needs.…
Truthful Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks
He Huang, Yu-e Sun, Xiang-yang Li +3
Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users of…