1 citations · 3 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers · 1 filter
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distri…
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading…
Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Bayesian persuasion is the study of information sharing policies among strategic agents. A prime example is signaling in online ad auctions: what information should a platform sign…
Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games
Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
We prove communication complexity lower bounds for (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games. In particular, we show that finding a Nash equilibrium requires c…
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic \emph{selection mechanism} is a probability distribution over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is \emph{incentive-compatible} (I…
Incentive-Compatible Classification
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mechanism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each oth…