10 citations · 51 across the 27 of their papers we have counts for
24 papers · 1 filter
Dueling over Multiple Pieces of Dessert
Simina Brânzei, Reed Phillips
We study the dynamics of repeated fair division between two players, Alice and Bob, where Alice partitions a cake into two subsets and Bob chooses his preferred one over rounds…
Computing Envy-Free up to Any Good (EFX) Allocations via Local Search
Simina Brânzei
We present a simple local search algorithm for computing EFX (envy-free up to any good) allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. EFX is a com…
Dueling Over Dessert, Mastering the Art of Repeated Cake Cutting
Simina Brânzei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Reed Phillips +2
We consider the setting of repeated fair division between two players, denoted Alice and Bob, with private valuations over a cake. In each round, a new cake arrives, which is ident…
Learning and Collusion in Multi-unit Auctions
Simina Brânzei, Mahsa Derakhshan, Negin Golrezaei +1
We consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform pricing, which are widely used in practice for allocating goods such as carbon licenses. In each round, identical units of…
Tit-for-Tat Dynamics and Market Volatility
Simina Brânzei
We consider tit-for-tat dynamics in production markets, where there is a set of players connected via a weighted graph. Each player can produce an eponymous good using its…
Multiplayer Bandit Learning, from Competition to Cooperation
Simina Brânzei, Yuval Peres
The stochastic multi-armed bandit model captures the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. We study the effects of competition and cooperation on this tradeoff. Suppose th…
Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies
Simina Brânzei, Nikhil R. Devanur, Yuval Rabani
We study the Proportional Response dynamic in exchange economies, where each player starts with some amount of money and a good. Every day, the players bring one unit of their good…
Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores
Simina Brânzei, Fedor Sandomirskiy
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities when monetary transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known for…
Sharing Information with Competitors
Simina Brânzei, Claudio Orlandi, Guang Yang
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty com…
Universal Growth in Production Economies
Simina Brânzei, Ruta Mehta, Noam Nisan
We consider a simple variant of the von Neumann model of an expanding economy, in which multiple producers make goods according to their production function. The players trade thei…
Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-unit Markets
Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not alw…
Communication Complexity of Cake Cutting
Simina Brânzei, Noam Nisan
We study classic cake-cutting problems, but in discrete models rather than using infinite-precision real values, specifically, focusing on their communication complexity. Using gen…
The Query Complexity of Cake Cutting
Simina Brânzei, Noam Nisan
We study the query complexity of cake cutting and give lower and upper bounds for computing approximately envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations with the minimum number of c…
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta
The fair division of resources is an important age-old problem that has led to a rich body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist…
To Give or Not to Give: Fair Division for Single Minded Valuations
Simina Brânzei, Yuezhou Lv, Ruta Mehta
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating co…
Walrasian Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions
Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen +1
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equili…
Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
Branislav Bosansky, Simina Branzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen +2
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the followe…
Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods
Simina Brânzei, Hadi Hosseini, Peter Bro Miltersen
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incom…
The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria
Haris Aziz, Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1
The Adjusted Winner procedure is an important fair division mechanism proposed by Brams and Taylor for allocating goods between two parties. It has been used in practice for divorc…
Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms
Simina Brânzei, Ariel D. Procaccia
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechan…
An Algorithmic Framework for Strategic Fair Division
Simina Brânzei, Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa +1
We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of allocating a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classical cake cutting p…
Equilibria of Chinese Auctions
Simina Brânzei, Clara Forero, Kate Larson +1
Chinese auctions are a combination between a raffle and an auction and are held in practice at charity events or festivals. In a Chinese auction, multiple players compete for sever…
The Authorship Dilemma: Alphabetical or Contribution?
Margareta Ackerman, Simina Brânzei
Scientific communities have adopted different conventions for ordering authors on publications. Are these choices inconsequential, or do they have significant influence on individu…
Matching Games with Additive Externalities
Simina Brânzei, Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan +2
Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by th…