activity
20092022
most citedSequential Auctions of Identical Items with Budget-Constrained Bidders

11 citations · 15 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

11 papers

math.CO2022

Localized versions of extremal problems

David Malec, Casey Tompkins

We generalize several classical theorems in extremal combinatorics by replacing a global constraint with an inequality which holds for all objects in a given class. In particular w…

math.CO2020

Saturation problems in the Ramsey theory of graphs, posets and point sets

Gábor Damásdi, Balázs Keszegh, David Malec +3

In 1964, Erdős, Hajnal and Moon introduced a saturation version of Turán's classical theorem in extremal graph theory. In particular, they determined the minimum number of edges in…

cs.DS2015

Approximate Deadline-Scheduling with Precedence Constraints

Hossein Efsandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghyi, Jochen Koenemann +3

We consider the classic problem of scheduling a set of n jobs non-preemptively on a single machine. Each job j has non-negative processing time, weight, and deadline, and a feasibl…

math.CO2015

De Bruijn-Erdős type theorems for graphs and posets

Pierre Aboulker, Guillaume Lagarde, David Malec +2

A classical theorem of De Bruijn and Erdős asserts that any noncollinear set of n points in the plane determines at least n distinct lines. We prove that an analogue of this theore…

cs.GT2014

How to Influence People with Partial Incentives

Erik D. Demaine, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini +4

We study the power of fractional allocations of resources to maximize influence in a network. This work extends in a natural way the well-studied model by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tar…

cs.GT2013

Prior-Independent Mechanisms for Scheduling

Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David Malec +1

We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assumption that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under vario…