activity
20102016
most citedFixed and Market Pricing for Cloud Services

12 citations · 16 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

stat.ML2016

A nonparametric sequential test for online randomized experiments

Vineet Abhishek, Shie Mannor

We propose a nonparametric sequential test that aims to address two practical problems pertinent to online randomized experiments: (i) how to do a hypothesis test for complex metri…

cs.GT2012

On the Incentive to Deviate in Core Selecting Combinatorial Auctions

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek

Recent spectrum auctions in the United Kingdom, and some proposals for future auctions of spectrum in the United States, are based on preliminary price discovery rounds, followed b…

cs.GT2012★ 12 cited

Fixed and Market Pricing for Cloud Services

Vineet Abhishek, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key

We study a model of congestible resources, where pricing and scheduling are intertwined. Motivated by the problem of pricing cloud instances, we model a cloud computing service as…

cs.GT2011★ 1 cited

On Bidding with Securities: Risk Aversion and Positive Dependence

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek, Steven R. Williams

DeMarzo et al. (2005) consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper d…

cs.GT2011

Auctions with a Profit Sharing Contract

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek, Steven R. Williams

We study the problem of selling a resource through an auction mechanism. The winning buyer in turn develops this resource to generate profit. Two forms of payment are considered: c…

cs.GT2010

Efficiency Loss in Revenue Optimal Auctions

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek

We study efficiency loss in Bayesian revenue optimal auctions. We quantify this as the worst case ratio of loss in the realized social welfare to the social welfare that can be rea…

cs.GT2010★ 3 cited

Revenue Optimal Auction for Single-Minded Buyers

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek

We study the problem of characterizing revenue optimal auctions for single-minded buyers. Each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle of items and has a value for the same.…