4 papers
Stability Under Valuation Updates in Coalition Formation
Fabian Frank, Matija NovakoviÄ, René Romen
Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a v…
The Power of Matching for Online Fractional Hedonic Games
Martin Bullinger, René Romen, Alexander Schlenga
We study coalition formation in the framework of fractional hedonic games (FHGs). The objective is to maximize social welfare in an online model where agents arrive one by one and…
Stability in Online Coalition Formation
Martin Bullinger, René Romen
Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous…
Online Coalition Formation under Random Arrival or Coalition Dissolution
Martin Bullinger, René Romen
Coalition formation explores how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. We consider a cardinal utility model with an additively s…