4 citations · 6 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Avoiding the Worst: The Computational Complexity of Not Worst-Responding
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock +3
Finding, counting, or determining the existence of pure Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given the others' actions, are known to be computationally intractable pr…
Game connectivity and adaptive dynamics in many-action games
Tom Johnston, Michael Savery, Alex Scott +1
We study the typical structure of games in terms of their connectivity properties. A game is `connected' if it has a pure Nash equilibrium and there is a best-response path from ev…
Economic dynamics with differential fertility
Francis Dennig, Bassel Tarbush
We characterize the outcomes of a canonical deterministic model for the intergenerational transmission of capital that features differential fertility. A fertility function determi…
On the existence of pure epsilon-equilibria
Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush
Departing from optimizing behavior by any ensures the existence of stable outcomes in a broad class of many-agent games where utilities are drawn from a joint distribution. S…
Satisficing Equilibrium
Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent plays one of her top actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and…
Game Connectivity and Adaptive Dynamics
Tom Johnston, Michael Savery, Alex Scott +1
We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (with…
Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games
Torsten Heinrich, Yoojin Jang, Luca Mungo +4
We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their…
Agreeing on Decisions: An Analysis with Counterfactuals
Bassel Tarbush
Moses & Nachum ([7]) identify conceptual flaws in Bacharach's generalization ([3]) of Aumann's seminal "agreeing to disagree" result ([1]). Essentially, Bacharach's framework requi…
Social network markets: the influence of network structure when consumers face decisions over many similar choices
Paul Ormerod, Bassel Tarbush, R. Alexander Bentley
In social network markets, the act of consumer choice in these industries is governed not just by the set of incentives described by conventional consumer demand theory, but by the…