3 papers
cs.GT2019
Envy, Regret, and Social Welfare Loss
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Okke Schrijvers +1
Incentive compatibility (IC) is one of the most fundamental properties of an auction mechanism, including those used for online advertising. Recent methods by Feng et al. and Lahai…
cs.GT2019
Online Learning for Measuring Incentive Compatibility in Ad Auctions
Zhe Feng, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka
In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism. Our goal is to 1) compute an es…
cs.GT2012
Self-Confirming Price Prediction Strategies for Simultaneous One-Shot Auctions
Michael P. Wellman, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald
Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the uncertain outcome of other auctions: the so-called exposure pro…