16 citations · 16 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Matching Algorithms for Blood Donation
Duncan C McElfresh, Christian Kroer, Sergey Pupyrev +5
Global demand for donated blood far exceeds supply, and unmet need is greatest in low- and middle-income countries; experts suggest that large-scale coordination is necessary to al…
The Parity Ray Regularizer for Pacing in Auction Markets
Andrea Celli, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Christian Kroer +1
Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at wh…
Welfare-Preserving -BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss
Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes +1
In this paper, we provide a transform from an -BIC mechanism into an exactly BIC mechanism without any loss of social welfare and with additive and negligible revenue…
Envy, Regret, and Social Welfare Loss
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Okke Schrijvers +1
Incentive compatibility (IC) is one of the most fundamental properties of an auction mechanism, including those used for online advertising. Recent methods by Feng et al. and Lahai…
Online Learning for Measuring Incentive Compatibility in Ad Auctions
Zhe Feng, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka
In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism. Our goal is to 1) compute an es…
Computing large market equilibria using abstractions
Christian Kroer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Eric Sodomka +1
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of info…