29 citations · 221 across the 38 of their papers we have counts for
26 papers · 1 filter
A Strategy-proof Mechanism For Networked Housing Markets
Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang
This paper studies a house allocation problem in a networked housing market, where agents can invite others to join the system in order to enrich their options. Top Trading Cycle i…
Sequential Persuasion Using Limited Experiments
Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang
Bayesian persuasion and its derived information design problem has been one of the main research agendas in the economics and computation literature over the past decade. However,…
A Truthful Referral Auction Over Networks
Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang
This paper studies a mechanism design problem over a network, where agents can only participate by referrals. The Bulow-Klemberer theorem proposes that expanding the number of part…
Collusion-proof And Sybil-proof Reward Mechanisms For Query Incentive Networks
Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang
This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is r…
Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets
Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang
Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation princip…
Optimal Anonymous Independent Reward Scheme Design
Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang +2
We consider designing reward schemes that incentivize agents to create high-quality content (e.g., videos, images, text, ideas). The problem is at the center of a real-world applic…