15 citations · 50 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers · 1 filter
Data Exchange Markets via Utility Balancing
Aditya Bhaskara, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Sungjin Im +3
This paper explores the design of a balanced data-sharing marketplace for entities with heterogeneous datasets and machine learning models that they seek to refine using data from…
Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets
Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Benjamin Plaut
A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching probl…
Predict and Match: Prophet Inequalities with Uncertain Supply
Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Sreenivas Gollapudi +2
We consider the problem of selling perishable items to a stream of buyers in order to maximize social welfare. A seller starts with a set of identical items, and each arriving buye…
Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets
Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Ali Shameli
Motivated by the emergence of popular service-based two-sided markets where sellers can serve multiple buyers at the same time, we formulate and study the {\em two-sided cost shari…
Two-sided Facility Location
Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Sreenivas Gollapudi +2
Recent years have witnessed the rise of many successful e-commerce marketplace platforms like the Amazon marketplace, AirBnB, Uber/Lyft, and Upwork, where a central platform mediat…
Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method
Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala
We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time…
Understanding Fashion Cycles as a Social Choice
Anish Das Sarma, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Rina Panigrahy +1
We present a formal model for studying fashion trends, in terms of three parameters of fashionable items: (1) their innate utility; (2) individual boredom associated with repeated…
Budget Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items
Sayan Bhattacharya, Gagan Goel, Sreenivas Gollapudi +1
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogene…