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20122025
most citedMechanism Design via Optimal Transport

88 citations · 311 across the 59 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2019Show all

7 papers · 1 filter

cs.DS2019★ 7 cited

Pandora's Box with Correlations: Learning and Approximation

Shuchi Chawla, Evangelia Gergatsouli, Yifeng Teng +2

The Pandora's Box problem and its extensions capture optimization problems with stochastic input where the algorithm can obtain instantiations of input random variables at some cos…

math.ST2019

Efficient Truncated Statistics with Unknown Truncation

Vasilis Kontonis, Christos Tzamos, Manolis Zampetakis

We study the problem of estimating the parameters of a Gaussian distribution when samples are only shown if they fall in some (unknown) subset . This core problem…

cs.GT2019

The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors

Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos

We study black-box reductions from mechanism design to algorithm design for welfare maximization in settings of incomplete information. Given oracle access to an algorithm for an u…

cs.LG2019★ 35 cited

Distribution-Independent PAC Learning of Halfspaces with Massart Noise

Ilias Diakonikolas, Themis Gouleakis, Christos Tzamos

We study the problem of {\em distribution-independent} PAC learning of halfspaces in the presence of Massart noise. Specifically, we are given a set of labeled examples $(\mathbf{x…

cs.GT2019

Diversity and Exploration in Social Learning

Nicole Immorlica, Jieming Mao, Christos Tzamos

In consumer search, there is a set of items. An agent has a prior over her value for each item and can pay a cost to learn the instantiation of her value. After exploring a subset…

cs.LG2019★ 9 cited

Learning to Prune: Speeding up Repeated Computations

Daniel Alabi, Adam Tauman Kalai, Katrina Ligett +3

It is common to encounter situations where one must solve a sequence of similar computational problems. Running a standard algorithm with worst-case runtime guarantees on each inst…

cs.GT2019

Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing

Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos

Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps…