88 citations · 88 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
Optimal Pricing is Hard
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos
We show that computing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction in unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian settings, i.e. the optimal item-pricing, is computationally hard even in singl…
Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support alon…
The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at on…