88 citations · 94 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Optimal Pricing is Hard
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos
We show that computing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction in unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian settings, i.e. the optimal item-pricing, is computationally hard even in singl…
Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support alon…
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos
We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure der…
The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at on…
Quantum Correlated Equilibria in Classical Complete Information Games
Alan Deckelbaum
We study the scenario where the players of a classical complete information game initially share an entangled pure quantum state. Each player may perform arbitrary local operations…