60 citations · 159 across the 35 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2015
Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction
Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Adrian Vetta
The simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) are the two primary mechanisms used to sell bandwidth. Under truthful bidding, the SMRA is…
cs.GT2015
On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Christoph Hunkenschröder +1
Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two sim…