8 citations · 14 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets
Saeed Alaei, Pooya Jalaly, Eva Tardos
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching mark…
Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations
Pooya Jalaly, Eva Tardos
We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem ai…
Learning and Trust in Auction Markets
Pooya Jalaly, Denis Nekipelov, Eva Tardos
In this paper, we study behavior of bidders in an experimental launch of a new advertising auction platform by Zillow, as Zillow switched from negotiated contracts to using auction…
Effect of Strategic Grading and Early Offers in Matching Markets
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Nishanth Dikkala, Eva Tardos
Strategic suppression of grades, as well as early offers and contracts, are well-known phenomena in the matching process where graduating students apply to jobs or further educatio…
Econometrics for Learning Agents
Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibr…
Composable and Efficient Mechanisms
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. W…