77 citations · 98 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
19 papers · 1 filter
No-Regret Learning in Stackelberg Security Games with an Unknown, Bounded Set of Attacker Types
Sabil Ahmad, Ishita, Aditi Singh +1
In a repeated Stackelberg security game, a defender commits in every round to a randomized allocation of its resources, and an attacker, drawn from a set of types, best-responds. E…
Fair Allocation under Conflict Constraints
Sarfaraz Equbal, Rohit Gurjar, Ayumi Igarashi +6
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding…
Sequential Solution Concepts in Cooperative Games with Generalized Characteristic Functions
Ashwin Goyal, Drashthi Doshi, Swaprava Nath
Motivated by the fact that the worth of a coalition may depend on the order in which agents arrive, Nowak and Radzik (1994) (NR) introduced cooperative games with generalized chara…
Likes, Budgets, and Equilibria: Designing Contests for Socially Optimal Advertising
Sayantika Mandal, Harman Agrawal, Swaprava Nath
We study competitive advertising on a social network. Each of firms allocates a budget across consumers, and a platform decides, through a contest success function (CSF), what…
Incentivize Contribution and Learn Parameters Too: Federated Learning with Strategic Data Owners
Drashthi Doshi, Aditya Vema Reddy Kesari, Avishek Ghosh +2
In federated learning (FL), a center trains a shared model from updates that clients compute on their private data. Collecting and training on data is costly, so a strategic client…
Fair Interval Scheduling of Indivisible Chores
Sarfaraz Equbal, Rohit Gurjar, Yatharth Kumar +3
We study the problem of fairly assigning a set of discrete tasks (or chores) among a set of agents with additive valuations. Each chore is associated with a start and finish time,…
A Gale-Shapley View of Unique Stable Marriages
Kartik Gokhale, Amit Kumar Mallik, Ankit Kumar Misra +1
Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifie…
Optimal Referral Auction Design
Rangeet Bhattacharyya, Parvik Dave, Palash Dey +1
The auction of a single indivisible item is one of the most celebrated problems in mechanism design with transfers. Despite its simplicity, it provides arguably the cleanest and mo…
Egalitarian and Congestion Aware Truthful Airport Slot Allocation Mechanism
Aasheesh Dixit, Garima Shakya, Suresh Kumar Jakhar +1
We propose a mechanism to allocate slots fairly at congested airports. This mechanism: (a) ensures that the slots are allocated according to the true valuations of airlines, (b) pr…
Social Distancing via Social Scheduling
Deepesh Kumar Lall, Garima Shakya, Swaprava Nath
Motivated by the need of {\em social distancing} during a pandemic, we consider an approach to schedule the visitors of a facility (e.g., a general store). Our algorithms take inpu…
Testing Preferential Domains Using Sampling
Palash Dey, Swaprava Nath, Garima Shakya
A preferential domain is a collection of sets of preferences which are linear orders over a set of alternatives. These domains have been studied extensively in social choice theory…
Removing Bias and Incentivizing Precision in Peer-grading
Anujit Chakraborty, Jatin Jindal, Swaprava Nath
We study peer-grading with competitive graders who enjoy a higher utility when their peers get lower scores. We propose a new mechanism, PEQA, that incentivizes such graders throug…
Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice: Blending mechanism design with and without money
Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Swaprava Nath +1
When a company undergoes a merger or transfers its ownership, the existing governing body has an opinion on which buyer should take over as the new owner. Similar situations occur…
Surprise in Elections
Palash Dey, Pravesh K. Kothari, Swaprava Nath
Elections involving a very large voter population often lead to outcomes that surprise many. This is particularly important for the elections in which results affect the economy of…
Efficiency and Budget Balance in General Quasi-linear Domains
Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm
We study efficiency and budget balance for designing mechanisms in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consid…
Dynamic Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations
Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari +1
We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a fir…
Game Theoretic Analysis of Production-Management Effort Distribution in Organizational Networks
Swaprava Nath, Balakrishnan, Narayanaswamy
Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or…
Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing
Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg +2
An exciting application of crowdsourcing is to use social networks in complex task execution. In this paper, we address the problem of a planner who needs to incentivize agents wit…
Dynamic Mechanism Design for Markets with Strategic Resources
Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Yadati Narahari +1
The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategi…