25 citations · 52 across the 23 of their papers we have counts for
28 papers
Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences
Ronen Gradwohl, Fengming Hu, Rann Smorodinsky
We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to (Knightian) uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We consider two properties: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks…
Randomization and Efficiency under Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study ex-ante Pareto efficiency of feasible outcomes in games with incomplete information. Our main observation is that excessive randomization leads to inefficiency. With a non…
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk
Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences.…
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents
Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
A data curator would like to collect data from privacy-aware agents. The collected data will be used for the benefit of all agents. Can the curator incentivize the agents to share…
On social networks that support learning
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
It is well understood that the structure of a social network is critical to whether or not agents can aggregate information correctly. In this paper, we study social networks that…
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer +1
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the…
Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer +1
The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal…
A Cardinal Comparison of Experts
Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky
In various situations, decision makers face experts that may provide conflicting advice. This advice may be in the form of probabilistic forecasts over critical future events. We c…
The Secretary Recommendation Problem
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performa…
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
We study the implications of endogenous pricing for learning and welfare in the classic herding model . When prices are determined exogenously, it is known that learning occurs if…
Recommendation Systems and Self Motivated Users
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Modern recommendation systems rely on the wisdom of the crowd to learn the optimal course of action. This induces an inherent mis-alignment of incentives between the system's objec…
Segmentation, Incentives and Privacy
Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Data driven segmentation is the powerhouse behind the success of online advertising. Various underlying challenges for successful segmentation have been studied by the academic com…
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The recent success of crowd-funding for supporting new and innovative products has been overwhelming with over 34 Billion Dollars raised in 2015. In many crowd-funding platforms, f…
On Comparison Of Experts
Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky
A policy maker faces a sequence of unknown outcomes. At each stage two (self-proclaimed) experts provide probabilistic forecasts on the outcome in the next stage. A comparison test…
Robust Forecast Aggregation
Itai Areili, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
Bayesian experts who are exposed to different evidence often make contradictory probabilistic forecasts. An aggregator, ignorant of the underlying model, uses this to calculate her…
The Crowdfunding Game
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The recent success of crowdfunding for supporting new and innovative products has been overwhelming with over 34 Billion Dollars raised in 2015. In many crowdfunding platforms, fir…
Hypergraphical Clustering Games of Mis-Coordination
Rann Smorodinsky, Shakhar Smorodinsky
We introduce and motivate the study of hypergraphical clustering games of mis-coordination. For two specific variants we prove the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium and provide…
Stable Secretaries
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman +3
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretari…
Multi-Issue Social Learning
Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky +1
We consider social learning where agents can only observe part of the population (modeled as neighbors on an undirected graph), face many decision problems, and arrival order of th…
Economic Recommendation Systems
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
In the on-line Explore and Exploit literature, central to Machine Learning, a central planner is faced with a set of alternatives, each yielding some unknown reward. The planner's…
Perception Games and Privacy
Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect…
Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms
Rakefet Rozen, Rann Smorodinsky
Consider an abstract social choice setting with incomplete information, where the number of alternatives is large. Albeit natural, implementing VCG mechanisms may not be feasible d…
Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems
Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
We introduce the study of sequential information elicitation in strategic multi-agent systems. In an information elicitation setup a center attempts to compute the value of a funct…
Signalling Competition and Social Welfare (Working Paper)
Gleb Polevoy, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
We consider an environment where sellers compete over buyers. All sellers are a-priori identical and strategically signal buyers about the product they sell. In a setting motivated…