20 papers
Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences
Ronen Gradwohl, Fengming Hu, Rann Smorodinsky
We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to (Knightian) uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We consider two properties: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks…
Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the tot…
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk
Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences.…
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents
Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
A data curator would like to collect data from privacy-aware agents. The collected data will be used for the benefit of all agents. Can the curator incentivize the agents to share…
On social networks that support learning
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
It is well understood that the structure of a social network is critical to whether or not agents can aggregate information correctly. In this paper, we study social networks that…
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer +1
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the…