66 citations · 102 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for
25 papers
Blockchain Monetary Policy, Strategic Participation, and the Dynamics of Decentralization
Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Manvir Schneider +1
Blockchain systems must navigate a fundamental tradeoff between rewarding capable participants for performance and preserving a sufficiently decentralized distribution of stake. We…
Non-Obvious Manipulability in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games
Diodato Ferraioli, Giovanna Varricchio, Maria Fomenko
Hedonic Games are a well-established model for describing the formation of coalitions. In this work, we considered the design of Non-Obviously Manipulable (NOM) mechanisms, that ar…
Stochastic Multi-round Submodular Optimization with Budget
Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Cosimo Vinci
In this work, we study the Stochastic Budgeted Multi-round Submodular Maximization (SBMSm) problem, where we aim to adaptively maximize the sum, over multiple rounds, of a monotone…
An Algorithmic Theory of Simplicity in Mechanism Design
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not o…
Election Manipulation in Social Networks with Single-Peaked Agents
Vincenzo Auletta, Francesco Carbone, Diodato Ferraioli
Several elections run in the last years have been characterized by attempts to manipulate the result of the election through the diffusion of fake or malicious news over social net…
On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
The design of algorithms or protocols that are able to align the goals of the planner with the selfish interests of the agents involved in these protocols is of paramount importanc…
On the Impact of Social Media Recommendations on Opinion Consensus
Vincenzo Auletta, Antonio Coppola, Diodato Ferraioli
We consider a discrete opinion formation problem in a setting where agents are influenced by both information diffused by their social relations and from recommendations received d…
Efficiency of Ad Auctions with Price Displaying
Matteo Castiglioni, Diodato Ferraioli, Nicola Gatti +2
Most of the economic reports forecast that almost half of the worldwide market value unlocked by AI over the next decade (up to 6 trillion USD per year) will be in marketing&sales.…
Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality
Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
The realization that selfish interests need to be accounted for in the design of algorithms has produced many contributions in computer science under the umbrella of algorithmic me…
Election Manipulation on Social Networks: Seeding, Edge Removal, Edge Addition
Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti, Giulia Landriani +1
We focus on the election manipulation problem through social influence, where a manipulator exploits a social network to make her most preferred candidate win an election. Influenc…
Election Manipulation on Social Networks with Messages on Multiple Candidates
Matteo Castiglioni, Diodato Ferraioli, Giulia Landriani +1
We study the problem of election control through social influence when the manipulator is allowed to use the locations that she acquired on the network for sending \emph{both} posi…
On the approximation guarantee of obviously strategyproof mechanisms
Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna +1
Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation algorithms. O…
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent…
Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who…
Commutative algebra: Constructive methods. Finite projective modules
Henri Lombardi, Claude Quitté
This book is an introductory course to basic commutative algebra with a particular emphasis on finitely generated projective modules. We adopt the constructive point of view, with…
Discrete Preference Games in Heterogeneous Social Networks: Subverted Majorities and the Swing Player
Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli +2
We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which co…
Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli +2
We study the revenue performance of sequential posted price mechanisms and some natural extensions, for a general setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correl…
Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks
Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli +2
It is often observed that agents tend to imitate the behavior of their neighbors in a social network. This imitating behavior might lead to the strategic decision of adopting a pub…
Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games
Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre
Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilib…
Convergence to Equilibrium of Logit Dynamics for Strategic Games
Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale +2
We present the first general bounds on the mixing time of the Markov chain associated to the logit dynamics for wide classes of strategic games. The logit dynamics with inverse noi…
Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
One of the main criticisms to game theory concerns the assumption of full rationality. Logit dynamics is a decentralized algorithm in which a level of irrationality (a.k.a. "noise"…
Imperfect best-response mechanisms
Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna
Best-response mechanisms (Nisan, Schapira, Valiant, Zohar, 2011) provide a unifying framework for studying various distributed protocols in which the participants are instructed to…
Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local-Interaction Games
Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale +2
Logit choice dynamics are a family of randomized best response dynamics based on the logit choice function [McFadden, 1974], used for modeling players with limited rationality and…
Metastability of Logit Dynamics for Coordination Games
Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale +1
Logit Dynamics [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] are randomized best response dynamics for strategic games: at every time step a player is selected uniformly at random and…