activity
20102024
most citedCommutative algebra: Constructive methods. Finite projective modules

66 citations · 82 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for

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7 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2023

Election Manipulation in Social Networks with Single-Peaked Agents

Vincenzo Auletta, Francesco Carbone, Diodato Ferraioli

Several elections run in the last years have been characterized by attempts to manipulate the result of the election through the diffusion of fake or malicious news over social net…

cs.GT2016★ 2 cited

Discrete Preference Games in Heterogeneous Social Networks: Subverted Majorities and the Swing Player

Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli +2

We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which co…

cs.GT2014

Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks

Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli +2

It is often observed that agents tend to imitate the behavior of their neighbors in a social network. This imitating behavior might lead to the strategic decision of adopting a pub…

cs.GT2012★ 1 cited

Convergence to Equilibrium of Logit Dynamics for Strategic Games

Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale +2

We present the first general bounds on the mixing time of the Markov chain associated to the logit dynamics for wide classes of strategic games. The logit dynamics with inverse noi…

cs.GT2012

Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local-Interaction Games

Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale +2

Logit choice dynamics are a family of randomized best response dynamics based on the logit choice function [McFadden, 1974], used for modeling players with limited rationality and…

cs.GT2011

Metastability of Logit Dynamics for Coordination Games

Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale +1

Logit Dynamics [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] are randomized best response dynamics for strategic games: at every time step a player is selected uniformly at random and…

cs.GT2010★ 11 cited

Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics

Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale +1

We study "logit dynamics" [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] for strategic games. This dynamics works as follows: at every stage of the game a player is selected uniformly…