1 citations · 1 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
cs.GT2012
Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents
Nikhil R. Devanur, Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline
We consider prior-free auctions for revenue and welfare maximization when agents have a common budget. The abstract environments we consider are ones where there is a downward-clos…
cs.GT2012★ 1 cited
The Biased Sampling Profit Extraction Auction
Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline
We give an auction for downward-closed environments that generalizes the random sampling profit extraction auction for digital goods of Fiat et al. (2002). The mechanism divides th…
cs.GT2011
Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction
Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline
There is only one technique for prior-free optimal mechanism design that generalizes beyond the structurally benevolent setting of digital goods. This technique uses random samplin…