64 citations · 120 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Peter Duersch, Joerg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class…
Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
Peter Duersch, Joerg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if…
Unbeatable Imitation
Peter Duersch, Joerg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and s…