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20122026
most citedMulti-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences

82 citations · 299 across the 40 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2017 · cs.GTShow all

6 papers · 2 filters

cs.GT2017★ 13 cited

Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints

Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi +2

We develop a model of multiwinner elections that combines performance-based measures of the quality of the committee (such as, e.g., Borda scores of the committee members) with div…

cs.GT2017★ 2 cited

Fair Knapsack

Till Fluschnik, Piotr Skowron, Mervin Triphaus +1

We study the following multiagent variant of the knapsack problem. We are given a set of items, a set of voters, and a value of the budget; each item is endowed with a cost and eac…

cs.GT2017

Robustness Among Multiwinner Voting Rules

Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +3

We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules…

cs.GT2017★ 2 cited

Optimal Average Satisfaction and Extended Justified Representation in Polynomial Time

Piotr Skowron, Martin Lackner, Edith Elkind +1

In this short note, we describe an approval-based committee selection rule that admits a polynomial-time algorithm and satisfies the Extended Justified Representation (EJR) axiom.…

cs.GT2017

Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules

Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron

This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We intr…

cs.GT2017★ 16 cited

The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality

Haris Aziz, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski +2

We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each com…